New York Times

Guantánamo Bay, After Jan. 20, 2009

To the Editor:

Re “Next President Will Face Test on Detainees” (front page, Nov. 3):

While it is likely that the Guantánamo prison camp contains some very dangerous people, the American public and the rest of world may never know the real truth. After years of torture and abuse, the confessions of anyone still held at Guantánamo Bay are highly suspect, and the unconstitutional military commissions set up to try them make achieving justice impossible in any real sense of the word.

No responsible person who is calling for Guantánamo’s closure would argue that those suspected of terrorist activities should be automatically set free if Guantánamo is closed down.

What we’re demanding is that the Guantánamo prison camp be closed, the flawed military commissions be shut down and a real system of justice, based on the Constitution, be used to determine the guilt or innocence of those held there. Such a system will not rely on torture, secret evidence and hearsay.

Only by closing Guantánamo and trying detainees in civilian courts or in military courts, governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, will justice prevail. Guantánamo can be shut down with the stroke of a president’s pen through executive order on his first day in office.

Anthony D. Romero 
Executive Director
American Civil Liberties Union 
New York, Nov. 3, 2008

To the Editor:

Although the Bush administration has long misled the public about the dangerousness of many Guantánamo detainees, there is little doubt that some have committed serious crimes. The question is what to do with them.

Detaining them endlessly without trial has marred America’s reputation, providing a boon to terrorist recruiters and discouraging cooperation with international law-enforcement efforts, particularly by those most likely to learn of suspicious activity.

It has also allowed the detainees to glorify themselves as combatants rather than bear the opprobrium of being labeled convicted criminals.

The best solution is to close Guantánamo and provide suspects fair trials in regular federal courts, not the discredited military commissions that allow convictions based on coerced testimony.

Under the Classified Information Procedures Act, federal courts have long experience striking the proper balance between a suspect’s due process rights and the need to safeguard intelligence sources and methods.

Such criminal prosecutions are the best way to neutralize dangerous suspects while allowing America to regain the moral high ground so necessary for the long-term success of the fight against terrorism.

Kenneth Roth 
Executive Director
Human Rights Watch
New York, Nov. 3, 2008

To the Editor:

I almost always agree with what Nicholas D. Kristof has to say, and that includes his contention that the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, should be closed (“Rejoin the World,” column, Nov. 2).

May I suggest, however, that rather than turning it into “an international center for research on tropical diseases that affect poor countries,” it would be more appropriate — and a clear repudiation of the policies of the Bush administration — to convert the base into an international center for human rights.

That kind of a Guantánamo would not only represent an affirmation by the United States against torture, it would also make Guantánamo a very different kind of thorn in the side of Cuba than it has been over most of the last 100 years, and might be what brings human rights to the Cuban people.

It could be a place for cultural exchange, academic study and conferences, and stand as a beacon for people all over the world who are or have been victims of torture and other violations of human rights. It would stand as a reminder to all governments that torture is a violation of international law and is not to be tolerated anywhere.

Bruce L. Wilder
Pittsburgh, Nov. 2, 2008

To the Editor:

I disagree with the first of Nicholas D. Kristof’s three ways for the United States to “rejoin the world.”

After the necessary closure of the Guantánamo prison, all of Guantánamo should be returned to Cuba as a gesture of friendship and reconciliation after more than 40 years of hostility. Our continued presence there is militarily unjustifiable and politically stupid.

If the place were to be turned into “an international center for research on tropical diseases,” the Cubans could do that themselves. Their expertise in tropical medicine is internationally respected, and the United States could learn much from them.

Robert Skloot 
Madison, Wis., Nov. 3, 2008

New York Times

Steven Erlanger

PARIS — A United Nations human rights official, investigating practices at Guantánamo Bay, has concluded that evidence obtained from the interrogations there is tainted and that foreign law enforcement and intelligence officials who took part in those interrogations violated their legal obligation to reject the use of torture and arbitrary detention.

The official, Martin Scheinin, is the special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, an unpaid position created in 2005 by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

“When evidence is obtained through cruel and inhumane treatment, we will be faced with situations where the courts decide they don’t have proper evidence,” Mr. Scheinin said in a telephone interview. “There may be suspicions of terrorism, but evidence is tainted, so courts have only one option, to drop the case. They should have thought about that from the beginning, but didn’t.”

Mr. Scheinin, who visited the detention center at Guantánamo in December 2007, published a report on Friday criticizing foreign governments that took part in the Guantánamo interrogations or condoned them while using the intelligence obtained. The document, first reported in The Washington Post on Friday, is nonbinding. It will be discussed with member states at the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva on March 10.

The United States military has allowed intelligence and law enforcement officials from more than a dozen countries to interrogate Guantánamo inmates, Mr. Scheinin said. Those countries — including France, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Jordan — and many other agencies have provided questions for American interrogators to ask. Some detainees “were interrogated under torture in other countries before reaching Guantánamo,” said Mr. Scheinin, citing Western agents who questioned detainees in Pakistan.

While President Obama signed an executive order in January to close the Guantánamo Bay detention camp within a year, the Pentagon has regularly said that prisoners are treated in accordance with international law and are not tortured. But the detainees in general were kept without being charged or tried.

“Guantánamo is not primarily for investigation, but for the gathering of intelligence,” Mr. Scheinin said.

The harshest part of the report accuses Western states of aiding or being complicit in torture. “The active participation by a state through the sending of interrogators or questions, or even the mere presence of intelligence personnel at an interview with a person who is being held in places where he is tortured or subject to other inhuman treatment, can be reasonably understood as implicitly condoning torture,” Mr. Scheinin says in his report. “States must introduce safeguards preventing intelligence agencies from making use of such intelligence.”

He cited the prospect of Guantánamo’s closing as “the pendulum swinging back,” but said national governments should investigate their involvement to make better rules and strengthen oversight of intelligence agencies.

New York Times

Sheryl Gay Stolberg

WASHINGTON, Sept. 6 — President Bush said Wednesday that 14 high-profile terror suspects held secretly until now by the Central Intelligence Agency — including the man accused of masterminding the Sept. 11 attacks — had been transferred to the detention center at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, to face military tribunals if Congress approves.

The suspects include Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, thought to be the Sept. 11 mastermind, and other close associates of Osama bin Laden. Mr. Bush said he had decided to “bring them into the open” after years in which the C.I.A. held them without charges in undisclosed sites abroad, in a program the White House had not previously acknowledged.

The announcement, in the East Room of the White House, was the first time the president had discussed the secret C.I.A. program, and he made clear that he had fully authorized it. Mr. Bush defended the treatment the suspects had received but would not say where the so-called “high-value terrorist detainees” had been held or what techniques had been used to extract information from them.

The transfer of the high-level suspects to Guantánamo Bay effectively suspended the extraordinary program, in which the intelligence agency became the jailer and interrogator of suspects counterterrorism officials considered the world’s most wanted Islamic extremists.

The government says the 14 terror suspects include some of the most senior members of Al Qaeda captured by the United States since 2001, including those responsible for the bombing of the destroyer Cole in 2000 in Yemen and the 1998 attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Most of the detainees have been interviewed extensively and are believed to have little remaining intelligence value.

With the transfer of the suspects to Guantánamo, which is run by the Defense Department, the International Committee of the Red Cross will monitor their treatment, Mr. Bush said. He used the East Room appearance to urge Congress to authorize new military commissions to put terror suspects on trial, replacing rules established by the administration but struck down in June by the Supreme Court.

“As soon as Congress acts to authorize the military commissions I have proposed, the men our intelligence officials believe orchestrated the deaths of nearly 3,000 Americans on Sept. 11, 2001, can face justice,” Mr. Bush said, to an audience that included family members of the victims. He added, “To start the process for bringing them to trial, we must bring them out into the open.”

To that end, the president sent Congress legislation proposing new rules for the commissions and detailing specific standards for the humane treatment of detainees. Yet the proposal hews closely to the old commission model, and it retains several provisions the court found troublesome, including language that permits defendants to be excluded from their own trials.

At the same time, the Pentagon released a new Army Field Manual that lays out permissible interrogation techniques and specifically bans eight methods that have come up in abuse cases. Among the techniques banned is water-boarding, in which a wet rag is forced down a bound prisoner’s throat to cause gagging; intelligence officials have said Mr. Mohammed was subjected to that treatment while in C.I.A. custody.

Although the C.I.A. has faced criticism over the use of harsh techniques, one senior intelligence official said detainees had not been mistreated. They were given dental and vision care as well as the Koran, prayer rugs and clocks to schedule prayers, the official said. They were also given reading material, DVD’s and access to exercise equipment.

Administration officials said the timing of Mr. Bush’s decision to bring the terror suspects to trial was driven not by politics but by the need to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision and the fact that the suspects were no longer regarded as sources of valuable intelligence.

On Capitol Hill, some Republicans reacted warily. But even those who criticized the proposal said it was imperative for Congress to pass legislation setting up tribunals soon.

“I do not believe it is necessary to have a trial where the accused cannot see the evidence against them,” said Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, a former military prosecutor who has played a central role in the debate. But Mr. Graham said he believed his differences with the White House “can be overcome.”

Mr. Bush’s speech was the third in a series he is delivering on the war on terror in the days before the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, and it carried potential political benefits for a White House that is intent on maintaining Republican control of Congress this November.

The address helped put a face on the enemy, reminding Americans that while Osama bin Laden — to whom Mr. Bush referred repeatedly in a speech on Tuesday — is still at large, many terrorists have been captured. Five years after the attacks, Mr. Bush gave the families of Sept. 11 victims something to cheer about, and those in the audience did, as he announced he wanted to put the suspects on trial.

By moving the high-profile suspects to Guantánamo just two months before the midterm elections, the administration is putting intense pressure on lawmakers to act before adjourning to campaign. If Democrats try to thwart legislation to try senior members of Al Qaeda, they will risk being labeled weak on national security, a label they can ill afford in an election that may turn on the question of which party is better suited to keep Americans safe.

“This is certainly a logical and very sound step both substantively and politically,” said David Rivkin, who served in the White House counsel’s office under the first President Bush and is sympathetic to this administration’s approach. “It’s reminding the country and the world of the folks we are fighting against. Nobody can say these are just pitiful foot soldiers; these are pretty senior guys.”

The C.I.A. program, though officially a secret, has been the subject of numerous news reports in recent months. By speaking publicly about it for the first time, Mr. Bush hopes to build support for it on Capitol Hill, and in the public.

The White House released biographies of the 14 suspects and details of the accusations against them. They include such well-known Qaeda operatives as Abu Zubaydah, who the administration said was trying to organize a terrorist attack in Israel at the time of his capture, and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who the authorities say helped facilitate the Sept. 11 attacks.

Despite the new information, human rights organizations were critical of Mr. Bush’s announcement.

“It’s wonderful that at last the United States has acknowledged that these detention sites exist,” said Larry Cox, executive director of Amnesty International U.S.A. But Mr. Cox described the program as “a form of torture,” and said the United States should suspend it.

In his speech, Mr. Bush fiercely resisted that characterization. “I want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world,” he said. “The United States does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it — and I will not authorize it.”

A senior intelligence official said there had been fewer than 100 detainees in the C.I.A. program since its inception shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks. Beyond the 14, the remainder have either been turned over to the Defense Department as so-called unlawful enemy combatants, returned to their countries of origin or sent to nations that have legal proceedings against them.

The official described the C.I.A. detainees as the government’s “single largest source of insight into Al Qaeda,” saying they accounted for 50 percent of everything the authorities had learned about the terrorist network. But, he said, “Some of these people have been held for a considerable period of time, and their intelligence value has aged off.”

Mr. Bush said the C.I.A. would not relinquish its capability to detain and question terrorism suspects, and the senior intelligence official said the administration intended that the program would continue. But agency officials — who feared employees might be subject to lawsuits or criminal prosecution — welcomed the hand-off of the detainees and the prospect that the C.I.A.’s role would be limited in future cases.

“I am confident that this will be greeted with relief by agency employees,” said Jeffrey H. Smith, a former general counsel for the C.I.A. “Many of them were uncomfortable with their role as jailers.”

Military justice experts say that if Congress passes the legislation, trials of some terror suspects at Guantánamo could begin relatively quickly, in three to four months. But the trials of the 14 high-value suspects, who are held in a special high-security facility separate from other detainees, might not begin for at least a year, because the government would have to build its case .

One expert who has been critical of the administration’s plan, Eugene R. Fidell, predicted that the proposal would attract a lawsuit.

“Going the way they have done this is in fact quite unfair to the very families of 9/11 victims who President Bush had at his meeting today,” Mr. Fidell said, “because those people need closure and in fact what he’s done is guarantee further protracted delay because of the inevitable litigation.”

On Capitol Hill, Democrats were also critical. Representative Jane Harman of California, the senior Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, said Mr. Bush should have disclosed the program years ago and called his speech “the opening salvo in the fall campaign.”

David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti contributed reporting for this article.

Hürriyet (Newspaper)

Cüneyt Ülsever

Turkey has undergone a number of military coups and witnessed as many attempts. Let’s not forget the murders committed by unknown perpetrators either. Many in southeastern Turkey were killed by individuals with some sort of link with the state. I am as certain of the existence of JİTEM as I am of the sun. I know that I was bugged upon the orders of retired generals, Şener Eruygur and Levent Ersöz, since I was considered to be a “dangerous journalist”. My name appeared on the flimsy lists they prepared.

In my novel titled “Hadji” and published in 2003, I narrated how an illegal structure nested inside the Turkish Armed Forces, or TSK.

The Ergenekon case is vital in our struggle for democracy as being the first to try coup plotters, maybe not putschers yet, and those who institutionalize illegal structures in the southeast.

Everyone making contributions to this case is in fact contributing a great deal to Turkey!

***

However, the legitimacy of the case is being harmed in five ways:

1) Information is being leaked to the pro-government media; therefore, highlighting several aspects of this case unnecessarily. They are nurturing revenge in society.

2) The existence of defendants, with no democratic world view and who have dreams of coups, and who also accept that what they do harms the sense of community, and yet deny what they do is a crime, negatively affects the case.

3) The number of claims suggesting that the Criminal Procedures Law is being violated is increasing.

4) A large portion of the claims in the case are based on legal or illegal wiretappings, and some may not be accepted as evidence.

***

5) Finally, we read news stories on the doubts surrounding the secret witnesses. For instance, two of these witnesses, who play a critical role in the trial of a military colonel for who nine consecutive life sentences is sought, have recanted their depositions claiming that the promises they were given have not been met yet. (Hürriyet daily, July 20, 2009)

In the petitions the two witnesses submitted to the court on June 26, 2009, they claimed the Security Forces had asked them to give false testimonies in exchange for rewards.

Both witnesses, former members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, have withdrawn their original statements claiming that the promises made had not been delivered!

***

This strange situation that emerged in Diyarbakır may have a tremendous impact on the Ergenekon case.

And the main reason is that the case in essence depends on phone wiretaps, on documents that have not been proven to be original, and on the testimonies of secret witnesses.

In fact, wiretapping, even if legal, does not stand alone as evidence.

Since the original of an infamous document hasn’t been found, the columnists that had lent their support were debunked.

And now we are seeing a slide the in credibility of the secret witnesses.

This strange scene that took place in Diyarbakır cast a shadow over all secret witnesses who gave depositions in the Ergenekon case.

At this point, those accused in the case will easily question the credibility of the secret witnesses if their trial is not going well.

They will claim that the statements made by these secret witnesses were made up in return for some sort of reward.

***

The public acceptance of the rulings handed down in this case will determine the direction of Turkey!

For now, however, the case is baffling!

EDITORIAL

New York Times 

Nearly three years after Congress created the military commissions at Guantánamo Bay, lawmakers and the Obama administration are working to undo the grievous damage to the Constitution, American justice and the nation’s global image. Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has produced a good first draft of a new military tribunals law that was approved unanimously by his committee.

 Mr. Levin showed courage taking on an issue long tainted by George W. Bush’s campaign of fear. And he set a standard all Americans can understand: Military tribunals must not subject prisoners to anything that Americans would not accept if the trials were in another country and a United States citizen was in the dock.

 After years of watching government lawyers undermine the rule of law, it has been especially gratifying to see President Obama’s lawyers urging senators to do even more to create a system that will fairly try prisoners and no longer shame Americans.

 At a hearing last week, Defense and Justice Department lawyers suggested major improvements in the Levin bill, which seeks to replace the 2006 Military Commissions Act. Most important, they said tribunals may not violate the Constitution’s due process requirements.

 There are still significant problems with the Levin bill. But it is a huge improvement over the kangaroo courts created to guarantee guilty verdicts against anyone Mr. Bush declared an unlawful enemy combatant.

 The new bill, which has the backing of two key Republican senators, John McCain and Lindsey Graham, embraces the basic principles of American justice and the Geneva Conventions in vital ways. It begins to restore the distinction between military offenses committed on an actual battlefield, which can be judged by a military tribunal, and crimes properly handled by civilian courts. The bill also:

 Gives defendants in tribunals more access to evidence, including classified evidence, relying on tested procedures used to protect national security.

Bars the use of evidence obtained through torture and cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment.

Gives lawyers on both sides more independence.

Puts the burden on prosecutors to justify the introduction of hearsay evidence, rather than compelling the defendant to prove that such evidence is unreliable.

These are all essential improvements for a deeply rotten system, but they are not enough.

In testimony last week, Jeh Johnson, legal counsel for the Defense Department, and David Kris, an assistant attorney general, urged the Senate to remove a clause that makes “material support” for hostilities against the United States a crime that can be tried in a military tribunal.

Mr. Kris said that is not likely to withstand judicial scrutiny, since it is a civilian crime, not a violation of the laws of war. Charges of material support — which could include writing a check to an organization that turns out to be linked to terrorist groups — are hard to define and can be unwitting or coerced.

While barring the use of evidence obtained by coercion, the bill is too vague in defining cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment — a concept twisted beyond recognition by Mr. Bush’s lawyers. Mr. Kris and Mr. Johnson said the law should permit only evidence given voluntarily, and define what that means in a military setting.

The administration lawyers also wisely suggested a “sunset” provision, which would require Congress to consider whether to continue tribunals after the legal nightmare Mr. Bush created is cleaned up.

The bill does not adequately address important concerns raised by the military lawyers defending Guantánamo inmates. The head of that group wrote to the Justice Department on June 9 saying that the current law requires only that defendants, even in capital cases, get a “reasonable opportunity” and money to find witnesses and retain outside experts, counsel and interpreters. They said any new law should meet the standards of military law (defense resources are equal to the prosecution’s) or civilian law (defendants get resources “necessary for adequate representation”).

Senator Levin acknowledged that shortcoming and promised to fix it. We hope he will display the same openness about other needed changes.

We welcome the Obama administration’s fierce defense of the law and its efforts to fix the military tribunals. But we are puzzled by its failure to make public a document vital to the effort. In May, according to news reports, the Justice Department laid out the constitutional requirements for a proper detainee policy, including military tribunals. It is irresponsible to have Congress consider this new bill without that document.

The White House and the Congressional leadership must do all they can to fix a shamefully broken system. We fear that some senators who voted for the Levin measure in committee are already weakening. Republican opponents are certain to revive the false charge that respecting the Constitution means coddling terrorists.

Since the 9/11 attacks, this country’s political leaders have too often chosen fear and political expediency over principle. That must not happen again.

EDITORIAL

New York Times

Ever since President Bush rammed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 through Congress to lend a pretense of legality to his detention camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, we have urged Congress to amend the law to restore basic human rights and judicial process. Rulings by military judges this week suggest that the special detention system is so fundamentally corrupt that the only solution is to tear it down and start again.

 The target of the judges’ rulings were Combatant Status Review Tribunals, panels that determine whether a prisoner is an “unlawful enemy combatant” who can be tried by one of the commissions created by the 2006 law. The tribunals are, in fact, kangaroo courts that give the inmates no chance to defend themselves, allow evidence that was obtained through torture and can be repeated until one produces the answer the Pentagon wants.

 On Monday, two military judges dismissed separate war crimes charges against two Guantánamo inmates because of the status review system. They said the Pentagon managed to get them declared “enemy combatants,” but not “unlawful enemy combatants,” and moved to try them anyway under the 2006 law. That law says only unlawful combatants may be tried by military commissions. Lawful combatants (those who wear uniforms and carry weapons openly) fall under the Geneva Conventions.

 If the administration loses an appeal, which it certainly should, it will no doubt try to tinker with the review tribunals so they produce the desired verdict. Congress cannot allow that. When you can’t win a bet with loaded dice, something is wrong with the game.

 There is only one path likely to lead to a result that would allow Americans to once again hold their heads high when it comes to justice and human rights. First, Congress needs to restore the right of the inmates of Guantánamo Bay to challenge their detentions. By the administration’s own count, only a small minority of the inmates actually deserve a trial. The rest should be sent home or set free.

 Second, Congress should repeal the Military Commissions Act and start anew on a just system for determining whether prisoners are unlawful combatants. Among other things, evidence obtained through coercion and torture should be banned.

 And Congress should shut down Guantánamo Bay, as called for in bills sponsored by two California Democrats, Representative Jane Harman in the House and Senator Dianne Feinstein in the Senate. Both lawmakers are intimately familiar with the camp and have concluded it is beyond salvaging.

 Their bill would close Gitmo in a year and the detainees would be screened by real courts. Those who are truly illegal combatants would be sent to military or civilian jails in the United States, to be tried under time-tested American rules of justice, or sent to an international tribunal. Some would be returned to their native lands for trial, if warranted. The rest would be set free, as they should have been long ago.

 The Guantánamo camp was created on a myth — that the American judicial system could not handle prisoners of “the war against terror.” It was built on a lie — that the hundreds of detainees at Gitmo are all dangerous terrorists. And it was organized around a fiction — that Mr. Bush had the power to create this rogue system in the first place.

 It is time to get rid of it.

MICHIGAN v. LONG 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN 

No. 82-256. 

Argued February 23, 1983 
Decided July 6, 1983 

Two police officers, patrolling in a rural area at night, observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. When the car swerved into a ditch, the officers stopped to investigate and were met by respondent, the only occupant of the car, at the rear of the car. Respondent, who “appeared to be under the influence of something,” did not respond to initial requests to produce his license and registration, and when he began walking toward the open door of the car, apparently to obtain the registration, the officers followed him and saw a hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the car. The officers then stopped respondent and subjected him to a patdown search, which revealed no weapons. One of the officers shined his flashlight into the car, saw something protruding from under the armrest on the front seat, and upon lifting the armrest saw an open pouch that contained what appeared to be marihuana. Respondent was then arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the car’s interior revealed no more contraband, but the officers decided to impound the vehicle and more marihuana was found in the trunk. The Michigan state trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the car’s interior and its trunk, and he was convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 . However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that Terry did not justify the passenger compartment search, and that the marihuana found in the trunk was the “fruit” of the illegal search of the car’s interior.

Held:

1. This Court does not lack jurisdiction to decide the case on the asserted ground that the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. Because of respect for the independence of state courts and the need to avoid rendering advisory opinions, this Court, in determining whether state court references to state law constitute adequate and independent state grounds, will no longer look beyond the opinion under review, or require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, this Court will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent state grounds, this Court will not undertake to review the decision. In this case, apart from two citations to the State Constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases. Even if it is accepted that the Michigan Constitution has been interpreted to provide independent protection for certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it fairly appears that the Michigan Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on federal law. Pp. 1037-1044. 

 

2. The protective search of the passenger compartment of respondent’s car was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. Although Terry involved the stop and subsequent patdown search for weapons of a person suspected of criminal activity, it did not restrict the preventive search to the person of the detained suspect. Protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger. Roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. Thus, the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of an automobile’s interior, the officer discovers contraband other than weapons, he cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances. The circumstances of this case justified the officers in their reasonable belief that respondent posed a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. Nor did they act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within respondent’s immediate grasp before permitting him to reenter his automobile. The fact that respondent was under the officers’ control during the investigative stop does not render unreasonable their belief that he could injure them. Pp. 1045-1052. 

 

3. Because the Michigan Supreme Court suppressed the marihuana taken from the trunk as a fruit of what it erroneously held was an illegal  search of the car’s interior, the case is remanded to enable it to determine whether the trunk search was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions of this Court. P. 1053. 

 

413 Mich. 461, 320 N. W. 2d 866, reversed and remanded.

O’CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in Parts I, III, IV, and V of which BLACKMUN, J., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 1054. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 1054. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 1065.

Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General of Michigan, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Leonard J. Malinowski, Assistant Attorney General.

David A. Strauss argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, and Deputy Solicitor General Frey.

James H. Geary argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Joseph J. Jerkins. 

David Crump, Wayne W. Schmidt, and James P. Manak filed a brief for the Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation of America et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

JUSTICE O’CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), we upheld the validity of a protective search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest because it is unreasonable to deny a police officer the right “to neutralize the threat of physical harm,” id., at 24, when he possesses an articulate suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. We did not, however, expressly address whether such a protective search for weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of probable cause to arrest. In the present case, respondent David Long was convicted for possession of marihuana found by police in the passenger compartment and trunk of the  automobile that he was driving. The police searched the passenger compartment because they had reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially dangerous to the officers. We hold that the protective search of the passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court. We also examine Long’s argument that the decision below rests upon an adequate and independent state ground, and we decide in favor of our jurisdiction.

I

Deputies Howell and Lewis were on patrol in a rural area one evening when, shortly after midnight, they observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. The officers observed the car turning down a side road, where it swerved off into a shallow ditch. The officers stopped to investigate. Long, the only occupant of the automobile, met the deputies at the rear of the car, which was protruding  from the ditch onto the road. The door on the driver’s side of the vehicle was left open.

Deputy Howell requested Long to produce his operator’s license, but he did not respond. After the request was repeated, Long produced his license. Long again failed to respond when Howell requested him to produce the vehicle registration. After another repeated request, Long, who Howell thought “appeared to be under the influence of something,” 413 Mich. 461, 469, 320 N. W. 2d 866, 868 (1982), turned from the officers and began walking toward the open door of the vehicle. The officers followed Long and both observed a large hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the car. The officers then stopped Long’s progress and subjected him to a Terry protective patdown, which revealed no weapons.

Long and Deputy Lewis then stood by the rear of the vehicle while Deputy Howell shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle, but did not actually enter it. The purpose of Howell’s action was “to search for other weapons.” 413 Mich., at 469, 320 N. W. 2d, at 868. The officer noticed that something was protruding from under the armrest on the front seat. He knelt in the vehicle and lifted the armrest. He saw an open pouch on the front seat, and upon flashing his light on the pouch, determined that it contained what appeared to be marihuana. After Deputy Howell showed the pouch and its contents to Deputy Lewis, Long was arrested for possession of marihuana. A further search of the interior of the vehicle, including the glovebox, revealed neither more contraband nor the vehicle registration. The officers decided to impound the vehicle. Deputy Howell opened the trunk, which did not have a lock, and discovered inside it approximately 75 pounds of marihuana.

The Barry County Circuit Court denied Long’s motion to suppress the marihuana taken from both the interior of the car and its trunk. He was subsequently convicted of possession of marihuana. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Long’s conviction, holding that the search of the passenger compartment was valid as a protective search under Terry, supra, and that the search of the trunk was valid as an inventory search under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See 94 Mich. App. 338, 288 N. W. 2d 629 (1979). The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that “the sole justification of the Terry search, protection of the police officers and others nearby, cannot justify the search in this case.” 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The marihuana found in Long’s trunk was considered by the court below to be the “fruit” of the illegal search of the interior, and was also suppressed. 

We granted certiorari in this case to consider the important question of the authority of a police officer to protect himself by conducting a Terry-type search of the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle during the lawful investigatory stop of the occupant of the vehicle. 459 U.S. 904 (1982).

II

Before reaching the merits, we must consider Long’s argument that we are without jurisdiction to decide this case because the decision below rests on an adequate and independent state ground. The court below referred twice to the State Constitution in its opinion, but otherwise relied exclusively on federal law. Long argues that the Michigan courts have provided greater protection from searches and seizures under the State Constitution than is afforded under the Fourth Amendment, and the references to the State Constitution therefore establish an adequate and independent ground for the decision below.

It is, of course, “incumbent upon this Court . . . to ascertain for itself . . . whether the asserted non-federal ground independently and adequately supports the judgment.” Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 773(1931). Although we have announced a number of principles in order to help us determine whether various forms of references to state law constitute adequate and independent state grounds, we openly admit that we have thus far not developed a satisfying and consistent approach for resolving this vexing issue. In some instances, we have taken the strict view that if the ground of decision was at all unclear, we would dismiss the case. See, e. g., Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52 (1934). In other instances, we have vacated,  see, e. g., Minnesota v. National Tea Co, 309 U.S. 551 (1940), or continued a case, see, e. g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), in order to obtain clarification about the nature of a state court decision. See also California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). In more recent cases, we have ourselves examined state law to determine whether state courts have used federal law to guide their application of state law or to provide the actual basis for the decision that was reached. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 732 -733, n. 1 (1983) (plurality opinion). Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 569 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 670 -671 (1982), we rejected an invitation to remand to the state court for clarification even when the decision rested in part on a case from the state court, because we determined that the state case itself rested upon federal grounds. We added that “[e]ven if the case admitted of more doubt as to whether federal and state grounds for decision were intermixed, the fact that the state court relied to the extent it did on federal grounds requires us to reach the merits.” Id., at 671.

This ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and independent state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of federal-state relations are involved. Moreover, none of the various methods of disposition that we have employed thus far recommends itself as the preferred method that we should apply to the exclusion of others, and we therefore determine that it is appropriate to reexamine our treatment of this jurisdictional issue in order to achieve the consistency that is necessary.

The process of examining state law is unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we are generally unfamiliar, and which often, as in this case, have not been discussed at length by the parties. Vacation and continuance for clarification have also been unsatisfactory both because of the delay and decrease in efficiency of judicial  administration, see Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S. 143 (1952), and, more important, because these methods of disposition place significant burdens on state courts to demonstrate the presence or absence of our jurisdiction. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244(1978) (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting); Department of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425, 427 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Finally, outright dismissal of cases is clearly not a panacea because it cannot be doubted that there is an important need for uniformity in federal law, and that this need goes unsatisfied when we fail to review an opinion that rests primarily upon federal grounds and where the independence of an alleged state ground is not apparent from the four corners of the opinion. We have long recognized that dismissal is inappropriate “where there is strong indication . . . that the federal constitution as judicially construed controlled the decision below.” National Tea Co., supra, at 556.

Respect for the independence of state courts, as well as avoidance of rendering advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground. It is precisely because of this respect for state courts, and this desire to avoid advisory opinions, that we do not wish to continue to decide issues of state law that go beyond the opinion that we review, or to require state courts to reconsider cases to clarify the grounds of their decisions. Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the court has reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved. If the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.

This approach obviates in most instances the need to examine state law in order to decide the nature of the state court decision, and will at the same time avoid the danger of our rendering advisory opinions. It also avoids the unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court. We believe that such an approach will provide state judges with a clearer opportunity to develop state jurisprudence unimpeded by federal interference, and yet will preserve the integrity of federal law. “It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. But it is equally important that ambiguous or obscure adjudications by state courts do not stand as barriers to a determination by this Court of the validity under the federal constitution of state action.” National Tea Co., supra, at 557.

The principle that we will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and independent state grounds  is based, in part, on “the limitations of our own jurisdiction.” Herb v. Pitcairn,324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945). The jurisdictional concern is that we not “render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” Id., at 126. Our requirement of a “plain statement” that a decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds does not in any way authorize the rendering of advisory opinions. Rather, in determining, as we must, whether we have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest on adequate and independent state grounds, see Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S., at 773 , we merely assume that there are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily on federal law. 

Our review of the decision below under this framework leaves us unconvinced that it rests upon an independent state ground. Apart from its two citations to the State Constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding of Terry and other federal cases. Not a single state case was cited to support the state court’s holding that the search of the passenger compartment was unconstitutional. Indeed,  the court declared that the search in this case was unconstitutional because “[t]he Court of Appeals erroneously applied the principles of Terry v. Ohio . . . to the search of the interior of the vehicle in this case.” 413 Mich., at 471, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. The references to the State Constitution in no way indicate that the decision below rested on grounds in any way independent from the state court’s interpretation of federal law. Even if we accept that the Michigan Constitution has been interpreted to provide independent protection for certain rights also secured under the Fourth Amendment, it fairly appears in this case that the Michigan Supreme Court rested its decision primarily on federal law.

Rather than dismissing the case, or requiring that the state court reconsider its decision on our behalf solely because of a mere possibility that an adequate and independent ground supports the judgment, we find that we have jurisdiction in the absence of a plain statement that the decision below rested on an adequate and independent state ground. It appears to us that the state court “felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the manner it did.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977). 

III

The court below held, and respondent Long contends, that Deputy Howell’s entry into the vehicle cannot be justified under the principles set forth in Terry because “Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of criminal activity” rather than a search of an area. 413  Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869 (footnote omitted). Brief for Respondent 10. Although Terry did involve the protective frisk of a person, we believe that the police action in this case is justified by the principles that we have already established in Terry and other cases.

In Terry, the Court examined the validity of a “stop and frisk” in the absence of probable cause and a warrant. The police officer in Terry detained several suspects to ascertain their identities after the officer had observed the suspects for a brief period of time and formed the conclusion that they were about to engage in criminal activity. Because the officer feared that the suspects were armed, he patted down the outside of the suspects’ clothing and discovered two revolvers.

Examining the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct in Terry, we held that there is “`no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’” 392 U.S., at 21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 -537 (1967). Although the conduct of the officer in Terry involved a “severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security,” 392 U.S., at 24 -25,  we found that the conduct was reasonable when we weighed the interest of the individual against the legitimate interest in “crime prevention and detection,” id., at 22, and the “need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.” Id., at 24. When the officer has a reasonable belief “that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.” Ibid.

Although Terry itself involved the stop and subsequent patdown search of a person, we were careful to note that “[w]e need not develop at length in this case, however, the limitations which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective search and seizure for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases.” Id., at 29. Contrary to Long’s view, Terry need not be read as restricting the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect. 

In two cases in which we applied Terry to specific factual situations, we recognized that investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms,434 U.S. 106 (1977), we held that police may order persons out of  an automobile during a stop for a traffic violation, and may frisk those persons for weapons if there is a reasonable belief that they are armed and dangerous. Our decision rested in part on the “inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile.” Id., at 110. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), we held that the police, acting on an informant’s tip, may reach into the passenger compartment of an automobile to remove a gun from a driver’s waistband even where the gun was not apparent to police from outside the car and the police knew of its existence only because of the tip. Again, our decision rested in part on our view of the danger presented to police officers in “traffic stop” and automobile situations. 

Finally, we have also expressly recognized that suspects may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. In the Term following Terry, we decided Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which involved the limitations imposed on police authority to conduct a search incident to a valid arrest. Relying explicitly on Terry, we held that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search “the arrestee’s person and the area `within his immediate control’ – construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” 395 U.S., at 763 . We reasoned that “[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.” Ibid. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), we determined that the lower courts “have found no workable definition of `the area within the immediate control of the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.” Id., at 460. In order to provide a “workable rule,” ibid., we held that “articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within `the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon’ . . . .” Ibid. (quoting Chimel, supra, at 763). We also held that the police may examine the contents of any open or closed container found within the passenger compartment, “for if the passenger compartment is within the reach of the arrestee, so will containers in it be within his reach.” 453 U.S., at 460 (footnote omitted). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981).

Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. See Terry, 392  U.S., at 21. “[T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id., at 27. If a suspect is “dangerous,” he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S., at 739 (plurality opinion by REHNQUIST, J.); id., at 746 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).

The circumstances of this case clearly justified Deputies Howell and Lewis in their reasonable belief that Long posed a danger if he were permitted to reenter his vehicle. The hour was late and the area rural. Long was driving his automobile at excessive speed, and his car swerved into a ditch. The officers had to repeat their questions to Long, who appeared to be “under the influence” of some intoxicant. Long was not frisked until the officers observed that there was a large knife in the interior of the car into which Long was about to reenter. The subsequent search of the car was restricted to those areas to which Long would generally have immediate control, and that could contain a weapon. The trial court determined that the leather pouch containing  marihuana could have contained a weapon. App. 64a. It is clear that the intrusion was “strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justifi[ed] its initiation.” Terry, supra, at 26.

In evaluating the validity of an officer’s investigative or protective conduct under Terry, the “[t]ouchstone of our analysis . . . is always `the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S., at 108 -109 (quoting Terry, supra, at 19). In this case, the officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within Long’s immediate grasp before permitting him to reenter his automobile. Therefore, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.

The Michigan Supreme Court appeared to believe that it was not reasonable for the officers to fear that Long could injure them, because he was effectively under their control during the investigative stop and could not get access to any weapons that might have been located in the automobile. See 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869. This reasoning is mistaken in several respects. During any investigative detention, the suspect is “in the control” of the officers in the sense that he “may be briefly detained against his will . . . .” Terry, supra, at 34 (WHITE, J., concurring). Just as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long’s position break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1134 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979). In addition,  if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792, 795-796 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910 (1977). Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation “at close range,” Terry, 392 U.S., at 24 , when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a “quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger . . . .” Id., at 28. In such circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter.

IV

The trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the search of the trunk as a valid inventory search under this Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The Michigan Supreme Court did not address this holding, and instead suppressed the marihuana taken from the trunk as a fruit of the illegal search of the interior of the automobile. Our holding that the initial search was justified under Terry makes it necessary to determine whether the trunk search was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. However, we decline to address this question because it was not passed upon by the Michigan Supreme Court, whose decision we review in this case. See Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 438 (1969). We remand this issue to the court below, to enable it to determine whether the trunk search was permissible under Opperman, supra, or other decisions of this Court. See, e. g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 

V

The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. 

Footnotes

It is clear, and the respondent concedes, that if the officers had arrested Long for speeding or for driving while intoxicated, they could have searched the passenger compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and the trunk under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), if they had probable cause to believe that the trunk contained contraband. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41. However, at oral argument, the State informed us that while Long could have been arrested for a speeding violation under Michigan law, he was not arrested because “[a]s a matter of practice,” police in Michigan do not arrest for speeding violations unless “more” is involved. See id., at 6. The officers did issue Long an appearance ticket. The petitioner also confirmed that the officers could have arrested Long for driving while intoxicated but they “would have to go through a process to make a determination as to whether the party is intoxicated and then go from that point.” Ibid.

The court below treated this case as involving a protective search, and not a search justified by probable cause to arrest for speeding, driving while intoxicated, or any other offense. Further, the petitioner does not argue that if probable cause to arrest exists, but the officers do not actually effect the arrest, the police may nevertheless conduct a search as broad as those authorized by Belton and Ross. Accordingly, we do not address that issue.

Chief Justice Coleman dissented, arguing that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), authorized the area search, and that the trunk search was a valid inventory search. See 413 Mich., at 473-480, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870-873. Justice Moody concurred in the result on the ground that the trunk search was improper. He agreed with Chief Justice Coleman that the interior search was proper under Terry. See 413 Mich., at 480-486, 320 N. W. 2d, at 873-875.

On the first occasion, the court merely cited in a footnote both the State and Federal Constitutions. See id., at 471, n. 4, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869, n. 4. On the second occasion, at the conclusion of the opinion, the court stated: “We hold, therefore, that the deputies’ search of the vehicle was proscribed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, 11 of the Michigan Constitution.” Id., at 472-473, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870.

For example, we have long recognized that “where the judgment of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to support the judgment.” Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935). We may review a state case decided on a federal ground even if it is clear that there was an available state ground for decision on which the state court could properly have relied. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 37 , n. 3 (1967). Also, if, in our view, the state court “`felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe . . . its own law in the manner it did,’” then we will not treat a normally adequate state ground as independent, and there will be no question about our jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979) (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 (1977). See also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 556 -557, n. 3 (1983). Finally, “where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the [federal ground] as not to be an independent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain the judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction is plain.” Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917).

 Indeed, Dixon v. Duffy is also illustrative of another difficulty involved in our requiring state courts to reconsider their decisions for purposes of clarification. In Dixon, we continued the case on two occasions in order to obtain clarification, but none was forthcoming: “[T]he California court advised petitioner’s counsel informally that it doubted its jurisdiction to render such a determination.” 344 U.S., at 145 . We then vacated the judgment of the state court, and remanded.

There may be certain circumstances in which clarification is necessary or desirable, and we will not be foreclosed from taking the appropriate action.

In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S., at 128 , the Court also wrote that it was desirable that state courts “be asked rather than told what they have intended.” It is clear that we have already departed from that view in those cases in which we have examined state law to determine whether a particular result was guided or compelled by federal law. Our decision today departs further from Herb insofar as we disfavor further requests to state courts for clarification, and we require a clear and express statement that a decision rests on adequate and independent state grounds. However, the “plain statement” rule protects the integrity of state courts for the reasons discussed above. The preference for clarification expressed in Herb has failed to be a completely satisfactory means of protecting the state and federal interests that are involved.

It is not unusual for us to employ certain presumptions in deciding jurisdictional issues. For instance, although the petitioner bears the burden of establishing our jurisdiction, Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 285 (1956), we have held that the party who alleges that a controversy before us has become moot has the “heavy burden” of establishing that we lack jurisdiction. County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631(1979). That is, we presume in those circumstances that we have jurisdiction until some party establishes that we do not for reasons of mootness.

We also note that the rule that we announce today was foreshadowed by our opinions in Delaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648 (1979), and Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). In these cases,  the state courts relied on both state and federal law. We determined that we had jurisdiction to decide the cases because our reading of the opinions led us to conclude that each court “felt compelled by what it understood to be federal constitutional considerations to construe and apply its own law in the manner it did.” Zacchini, supra, at 568; Delaware, supra, at 653. In Delaware, we referred to prior state decisions that confirmed our understanding of the opinion in that case, but our primary focus was on the face of the opinion. In Zacchini, we relied entirely on the syllabus and opinion of the state court.

In dissent, JUSTICE STEVENS proposes the novel view that this Court should never review a state court decision unless the Court wishes to vindicate a federal right that has been endangered. The rationale of the dissent is not restricted to cases where the decision is arguably supported by adequate and independent state grounds. Rather, JUSTICE STEVENS appears to believe that even if the decision below rests exclusively on federal grounds, this Court should not review the decision as long as there is no federal right that is endangered.

The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigation in this country. In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding juvenile and traffic charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and the District of Columbia. See 7 State Court Journal, No. 1, p. 18 (1983). By comparison, approximately 32,700 criminal suits were filed in federal courts during that same year. See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 6 (1982). The state courts are required to apply federal constitutional standards, and they necessarily create a considerable body of “federal law” in the process. It is not surprising that this Court has become more interested in the application and development of federal law by state courts in the light of the recent significant expansion of federally created standards that we have imposed on the States.

At oral argument, Long argued that the state court relied on its decision in People v. Reed, 393 Mich. 342, 224 N. W. 2d 867, cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 29. However, the court cited that case only in the context of a statement that the State did not seek to justify the search in this case “by reference to other exceptions to the   warrant requirement.” 413 Mich., at 472, 320 N. W. 2d, at 869-870 (footnote omitted). The court then noted that Reed held that “`[a] warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. 1, 11 of the state constitution unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule.’” 413 Mich., at 472-473, n. 8, 320 N. W. 2d, at 870, n. 8.

There is nothing unfair about requiring a plain statement of an independent state ground in this case. Even if we were to rest our decision on an evaluation of the state law relevant to Long’s claim, as we have sometimes done in the past, our understanding of Michigan law would also result in our finding that we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Under state search-and-seizure law, a “higher standard” is imposed under Art. 1, 11, of the 1963 Michigan Constitution. See People v. Secrest, 413 Mich. 521, 525, 321 N. W. 2d 368, 369 (1982). If, however, the item seized is, inter  alia, a “narcotic drug . . . seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state,” Art. 1, 11, of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, then the seizure is governed by a standard identical to that imposed by the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 435, 216 N. W. 2d 770, 775 (1974).

Long argues that under the current Michigan Comp. Laws 333.7107 (1979), the definition of a “narcotic” does not include marihuana. The difficulty with this argument is that Long fails to cite any authority for the proposition that the term “narcotic” as used in the Michigan Constitution is dependent on current statutory definitions of that term. Indeed, it appears that just the opposite is true. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that constitutional provisions are presumed “to be interpreted in accordance with existing laws and legal usages of the time” of the passage of the provision. Bacon v. Kent-Ottawa Authority, 354 Mich. 159, 169, 92 N. W. 2d 492, 497 (1958). If the state legislature were able to change the interpretation of a constitutional provision by statute, then the legislature would have “the power of outright repeal of a duly-voted constitutional provision.” Ibid. Applying these principles, the Michigan courts have held that a statute passed subsequent to the applicable state constitutional provision is not relevant for interpreting its Constitution, and that a definition in a legislative Act pertains only to that Act. Jones v. City of Ypsilanti, 26 Mich. App. 574, 182 N. W. 2d 795 (1970). See also Walber v. Piggins, 2 Mich. App. 145, 138 N. W. 2d 772 (1966), aff’d, 381 Mich. 138, 160 N. W. 2d 876 (1968). At the time that the 1963 Michigan Constitution was enacted, it is clear that marihuana was considered a narcotic drug. See 1961 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 206, 1(f). Indeed, it appears that marihuana was considered a narcotic drug in Michigan until 1978, when it was removed from the narcotic classification. We would conclude that the seizure of marihuana in Michigan is not subject to analysis under any “higher standard” than may be imposed on the seizure of other items. In the light of our holding in Delaware v. Prouse,440 U.S. 648 (1979), that an interpretation of state law in our view compelled by federal constitutional considerations is not an independent state ground, we would have jurisdiction to decide the case.

Although we did not in any way weaken the warrant requirement, we acknowledged that the typical “stop and frisk” situation involves “an entire rubric of police conduct – necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat – which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Terry, 392 U.S., at 20(footnote omitted). We have emphasized that the propriety of a Terry stop and frisk is to be judged according to whether the officer acted as a “reasonably prudent man” in deciding that the intrusion was justified. Id., at 27. “A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).

As Chief Justice Coleman noted in her dissenting opinion in the present case:

“The opinion in Terry authorized the frisking of an overcoat worn by defendant because that was the issue presented by the facts. One could reasonably conclude that a different result would not have been constitutionally required if the overcoat had been carried, folded over the forearm, rather than worn. The constitutional principles stated in Terry would still control.” 413 Mich., at 475-476, 320 N. W. 2d, at 871 (footnote omitted). 

According to one study, “approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings – A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 93 (1963).” Adams v. Williams, supra, at 148, n. 3.

We stress that our decision does not mean that the police may conduct automobile searches whenever they conduct an investigative stop, although the “bright line” that we drew in Belton clearly authorizes such a search whenever officers effect a custodial arrest. An additional interest exists in the arrest context, i. e., preservation of evidence, and this justifies an “automatic” search. However, that additional interest does not exist in the Terry context. A Terry search, “unlike a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest, is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or destruction of evidence of crime. . . . The sole justification of the search . . . is the protection of the police officer and others nearby . . . .” 392 U.S., at 29 . What we borrow now from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and Belton is merely the recognition that part of the reason to allow area searches incident to an arrest is that the arrestee, who may not himself be armed, may be able to gain access to weapons to injure officers or others nearby, or otherwise to hinder legitimate police activity. This recognition applies as well in the Terry context. However, because the interest in collecting and preserving evidence is not present in the Terry context, we require that officers who conduct area searches during investigative detentions must do so only when they have the level of suspicion identified in Terry.

Of course, our analysis would apply to justify the search of Long’s person that was conducted by the officers after the discovery of the knife.

Long makes a number of arguments concerning the invalidity of the search of the passenger compartment. The thrust of these argument is that Terry searches are limited in scope and that an area search is fundamentally inconsistent with this limited scope. We have recognized that Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see, e. g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 -94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous.

Long also argues that there cannot be a legitimate Terry search based on the discovery of the hunting knife because Long possessed that weapon legally. See Brief for Respondent 17. Assuming, arguendo, that Long possessed the knife lawfully, we have expressly rejected the view that the validity of a Terry search depends on whether the weapon is possessed in accordance with state law. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S., at 146 .

Contrary to JUSTICE BRENNAN’s suggestion in dissent, the reasoning of Terry, Chimel, and Belton points clearly to the direction that we have taken today. Although Chimel involved a full custodial arrest, the rationale for Chimel rested on the recognition in Terry that it is unreasonable to prevent the police from taking reasonable steps to protect their safety.  

JUSTICE BRENNAN suggests that we are expanding the scope of a Terry-type search to include a search incident to a valid arrest. However, our opinion clearly indicates that the area search that we approve is limited to a search for weapons in circumstances where the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous to them. JUSTICE BRENNAN quotes at length from Sibron, but fails to recognize that the search in that case was a search for narcotics, and not a search for weapons.

JUSTICE BRENNAN concedes that “police should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in the performance of their duties,” post, at 1064, but then would require that police officers, faced with having to make quick determinations about self-protection and the defense of innocent citizens in the area, must also decide instantaneously what “less intrusive” alternative exists to ensure that any threat presented by the suspect will be neutralized. Post, at 1065. For the practical reasons explained in Terry, 392 U.S., at 24 , 28, we have never required police to adopt alternative measures to avoid a legitimate Terry-type intrusion.

Long suggests that the trunk search is invalid under state law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41, 43-44. The Michigan Supreme Court is, of course, free to determine the validity of that search under state law.

JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, III, IV, and V of the Court’s opinion. While I am satisfied that the Court has jurisdiction in this particular case, I do not join the Court, in Part II of its opinion, in fashioning a new presumption of jurisdiction over cases coming here from state courts. Although I agree with the Court that uniformity in federal criminal law is desirable, I see little efficiency and an increased danger of advisory opinions in the Court’s new approach.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting.

The Court today holds that “the protective search of the passenger compartment” of the automobile involved in this case “was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry and other decisions of this Court.” Ante, at 1035. I disagree. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), does not support the Court’s conclusion and the reliance on “other decisions” is patently misplaced. Plainly, the Court is simply continuing the process of distorting Terry beyond recognition and forcing it into service as an unlikely weapon against the Fourth Amendment’s fundamental requirement that searches and seizures be based on probable cause. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 714 -717 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). I, therefore, dissent.    

On three occasions this Term I have discussed the limited scope of the exception to the probable-cause requirement created by Terry and its progeny. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509 -511 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 364 -365 (1983) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); United States v. Place, supra, at 711-717 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). I will not repeat those discussions here and note only that “Terry, and the cases that followed it, permit only brief investigative stops and extremely limited searches based on reasonable suspicion.” 462 U.S., at 714 . However, the Court’s opinion compels a detailed review of Terry itself.

In Terry, the Court confronted the “quite narrow question” of “whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.” 392 U.S., at 15 (emphasis supplied). Because the Court was dealing “with an entire rubric of police conduct . . . which historically [had] not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure,” id., at 20, the Court tested the conduct at issue “by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ibid. (footnote omitted). In considering the “reasonableness” of the conduct, the Court balanced “`the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’” Id., at 21, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 -535, 536-537 (1967). It deserves emphasis that in discussing the “invasion” at issue, the Court stated that “[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security . . . .”392 U.S., at 24 -25 (emphasis supplied). Ultimately, the Court concluded that “there must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable  cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id., at 27 (emphasis supplied). The Court expressed its holding as follows:

“We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id., at 30 (emphasis supplied). 

It is clear that Terry authorized only limited searches of the person for weapons. In light of what Terry said, relevant portions of which the Court neglects to quote, the Court’s suggestion that “Terry need not be read as restricting the preventive search to the person of the detained suspect,” ante, at 1047 (footnote omitted), can only be described as disingenuous. Nothing in Terry authorized police officers to search a suspect’s car based on reasonable suspicion. The Court confirmed this this very Term in United States v. Place, supra, where it described the search authorized by Terry as a “limited search for weapons, or `frisk’ . . . .” 462 U.S., at 702 . The search at issue in this case is a far cry from a “frisk” and certainly was not “limited.”    

The Court’s reliance on Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), as support for its new “area search” rule within the context of a Terry stop is misplaced. In Chimel, the Court addressed the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest, 395 U.S., at 753 , and held invalid the search at issue there because it “went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him.” Id., at 768. Chimel stressed the need to limit the scope of searches incident to arrest and overruled two prior decisions of this Court validating overly broad searches. Ibid.

In Belton, the Court considered the scope of a search incident to the lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile. 453 U.S., at 455 . In this “particular and problematic context,” id., at 460, n. 3, the Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Id., at 460 (footnote omitted). 

The critical distinction between this case and Terry on the one hand, and Chimel and Belton on the other, is that the latter two cases arose within the context of lawful custodial arrests supported by probable cause. The Court in Terry expressly recognized the difference between a search incident to arrest and the “limited search for weapons,” 392 U.S., at 25 , involved in that case. The Court stated:  

“[A search incident to arrest], although justified in part by the acknowledged necessity to protect the arresting officer from assault with a concealed weapon, . . . is also justified on other grounds, . . . and can therefore involve a relatively extensive exploration of the person. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest, however, must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. . . . Thus it must be limited to that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as something less than a `full’ search, even though it remains a serious intrusion. 

“. . . An arrest is a wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom from a limited search for weapons, and the interests each is designed to serve are likewise quite different. An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society’s interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual’s freedom of movement, whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows. The protective search for weapons, on the other hand, constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity of the person.” Id., at 25-26 (footnote omitted). 

In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the Court relied on the differences between searches incident to lawful custodial arrests and Terry “stop-and-frisk” searches to reject an argument that the limitations established in Terry should be applied to a search incident to arrest. 414 U.S., at 228 . The Court noted that “Terry clearly recognized the distinction between the two types of searches, and that a different rule governed one than governed the other,” id., at 233, and described Terry as involving “stricter . . . standards,” 414 U.S., at 234 , than those governing searches incident to arrest. The Court went on to state: 

“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a `reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” Id., at 235. 

See also id., at 237-238 (POWELL, J., concurring) (“The search incident to arrest is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the privacy interest protected by that constitutional guarantee is legitimately abated by the fact of arrest” (footnote omitted)); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 264 (1973).

As these cases recognize, there is a vital difference between searches incident to lawful custodial arrests and Terry protective searches. The Court deliberately ignores that difference in relying on principles developed within the context of intrusions supported by probable cause to arrest to construct an “area search” rule within the context of a Terry stop.

The Court denies that an “area search” is fundamentally inconsistent with Terry, see ante, at 1052, n. 16, stating:

“We have recognized that Terry searches are limited insofar as they may not be conducted in the absence of an articulable suspicion that the intrusion is justified, see e. g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968), and that they are protective in nature and limited to weapons, see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 -94 (1979). However, neither of these concerns is violated by our decision. To engage in an area search, which is limited to seeking weapons, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” Ibid.  

This patently is no answer: respondent’s argument relates to the scope of the search, not to the standard that justifies it. The Court flouts Terry’s holding that Terry searches must be carefully limited in scope. See supra, at 1056. Indeed, the page in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), cited by the Court states:

“Even assuming arguendo that there were adequate grounds to search Sibron for weapons, the nature and scope of the search conducted by Patrolman Martin were so clearly unrelated to that justification as to render the heroin inadmissible. The search for weapons approved in Terry consisted solely of a limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for concealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault. Only when he discovered such objects did the officer in Terry place his hands in the pockets of the men he searched. In this case, with no attempt at an initial limited exploration for arms, Patrolman Martin thrust his hand into Sibron’s pocket and took from him envelopes of heroin. His testimony shows that he was looking for narcotics, and he found them. The search was not reasonably limited in scope to the accomplishment of the only goal which might conceivably have justified its inception – the protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man.” Id., at 65 (emphasis supplied). 

As this passage makes clear, the scope of a search is determined not only by reference to its purpose, but also by reference to its intrusiveness. Yet the Court today holds that a search of a car (and the containers within it) that is not even occupied by the suspect is only as intrusive as, or perhaps less intrusive than, thrusting a hand into a pocket after an  initial patdown has suggested the presence of concealed objects that might be used as weapons.

The Court suggests no limit on the “area search” it now authorizes. The Court states that a “search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on `specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” Ante, at 1049 (footnote omitted). Presumably a weapon “may be placed or hidden” anywhere in a car. A weapon also might be hidden in a container in the car. In this case, the Court upholds the officer’s search of a leather pouch because it “could have contained a weapon.” Ante, at 1050-1051 (footnote omitted). In addition, the Court’s requirement that an officer have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and dangerous does little to check the initiation of an area search. In this case, the officers saw a hunting knife in the car, see ante, at 1036, 1050, but the Court does not base its holding that the subsequent search was permissible on the ground that possession of the knife may have been illegal under state law. See ante, at 1052-1053, n. 16. An individual can lawfully possess many things that can be used as weapons. A hammer, or a baseball bat, can be used as a very effective weapon. Finally, the Court relies on the following facts to conclude that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that respondent was presently dangerous: the hour was late; the area was rural; respondent had been driving at an excessive speed; he had been involved in an accident; he was not immediately responsive to the officers’ questions; and he appeared to be under the influence of some intoxicant. Ante, at 1050. Based on these facts, one might reasonably conclude that respondent was drunk. A drunken driver is indeed dangerous while driving, but not while stopped on the roadside by  the police. Even when an intoxicated person lawfully has in his car an object that could be used as a weapon, it requires imagination to conclude that he is presently dangerous. Even assuming that the facts in this case justified the officers’ initial “frisk” of respondent, see ante, at 1035-1036, 1050-1051, and n. 15, they hardly provide adequate justification for a search of a suspect’s car and the containers within it. This represents an intrusion not just different in degree, but in kind, from the intrusion sanctioned by Terry. In short, the implications of the Court’s decision are frightening.

The Court also rejects the Michigan Supreme Court’s view that it “was not reasonable for the officers to fear that [respondent] could injure them, because he was effectively under their control during the investigative stop and could not get access to any weapons that might have been located in the automobile.” Ante, at 1051. In this regard, the Court states:

“[W]e stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation `at close range,’. . . when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a `quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.’ . . . In such circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter.” Ante, at 1052 (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 

Putting aside the fact that the search at issue here involved a far more serious intrusion than that “involved in a Terry encounter,” see ibid., and as such might suggest the need for resort to “alternative means,” the Court’s reasoning is perverse. The Court’s argument in essence is that the absence of probable cause to arrest compels the conclusion that a broad search, traditionally associated in scope with a search incident to arrest, must be permitted based on reasonable suspicion. But United States v. Robinson, stated: “It is  scarcely open to doubt that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type stop.” 414 U.S., at 234 -235. In light of Robinson’s observation, today’s holding leaves in grave doubt the question of whether the Court’s assessment of the relative dangers posed by given confrontations is based on any principled standard.

Moreover, the Court’s reliance on a “balancing” of the relevant interests to justify its decision, see ante, at 1051, is certainly inappropriate. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the Court stated that “[t]he narrow intrusions involved in [Terry and its progeny] were judged by a balancing test rather than by the general principle that Fourth Amendment seizures must be supported by the `long-prevailing standards’ of probable cause, . . . only because these intrusions fell far short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.” Id., at 212. The intrusion involved in this case is precisely “the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest.” There is no justification, therefore, for “balancing” the relevant interests.

In sum, today’s decision reflects once again the threat to Fourth Amendment values posed by “balancing.” See United States v. Place, 462 U.S., at 717 -719 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). As Justice Frankfurter stated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950):

“To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of reason. It is no guide at all either for a jury or for district judges or the police to say that an `unreasonable search’ is forbidden – that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason which makes a search reasonable? The test is the reason underlying and expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to which it was a response.” Id., at 83 (dissenting opinion).   

Hornbook law has been that “the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so.” New York v. Belton, 453 U.S., at 457 . While under some circumstances the police may search a car without a warrant, see, e. g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132(1925), “the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll . . . applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable cause.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (footnote omitted). “[T]he Court in Carroll emphasized the importance of the requirement that officers have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” Id., at 807-808. See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 (1973) (“Automobile or no automobile, there must be probable cause for the search” (footnote omitted)). Today the Court discards these basic principles and employs the very narrow exception established by Terry “to swallow the general rule that Fourth Amendment [searches of cars] are `reasonable’ only if based on probable cause.” Dunaway v. New York, supra, at 213. See also United States v. Place, supra, at 718-719 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result).

Today’s decision disregards the Court’s warning in Almeida-Sanchez: “The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power. It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.”413 U.S., at 273 . Of course, police should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in the performance of their duties. But a search of a car and the containers within it based on nothing more than reasonable suspicion, even under the circumstances present   here, cannot be sustained without doing violence to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. There is no reason in this case why the officers could not have pursued less intrusive, but equally effective, means of insuring their safety. Cf. United States v. Place, supra, at 715-716; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S., at 511 , n. (BRENNAN, J., concurring in result). The Court takes a long step today toward “balancing” into oblivion the protections the Fourth Amendment affords. I dissent, for as Justice Jackson said in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949):

“[Fourth Amendment rights] are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.” Id., at 180 (dissenting opinion).